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Aggregation and Representation in
European Parliament Party Groups
RICHARD ROSE and GABRIELA BORZ
While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their
votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The
uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party
groups challenges theories of representation based on national parties and parliaments.
This article provides a theoretical means of understanding representation by linking the
aggregation of dozens of national party programmes in different EP party groups to the
aggregation of groups to produce the parliamentary majority needed to enact policies.
Drawing on an original data source of national party programmes, the EU Proﬁler, the
article shows that the EP majorities created by aggregating MEP votes in party groups
are best explained by cartel theories. These give priority to strengthening the EP’s col-
lective capacity to enact policies rather than voting in accord with the programmes they
were nationally elected to represent.
Theories of representation postulate that in a democratic political system there
should be a high degree of congruence between the policy preferences of vot-
ers and the programmes of the parties that represent them (Rosema et al. 2011:
Part I). However, as Cox (1997: 225) has emphasised, representation is not
only about ‘having one’s views voiced in the legislature’ but also about ‘hav-
ing one’s views reﬂected in the ﬁnal product of the legislative decision-making
process, that is, in enacted policy’. Therefore, there should also be a high
degree of congruence between the programmes that parties offer their voters
and the policies that they endorse in parliament. Parties must aggregate ‘the
interests, claims and demands’ articulated by their voters into programmes that
can be enacted by government (Almond 1960: 38f; cf. Mair and Thomassen
2010; Pitkin 1967). Since the number of ways in which the ‘common and
opposed’ views of the electorate could combine is far greater than the number
of effective parties in a national party system, aggregation is a process that
‘necessarily involves a reduction in the number of competitors’ and in the
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extent to which the positions of parties can be totally congruent with those of
their electorates (Cox 1997: 4f; Wessels 2011).
Our aggregation model emphasises the contingent conditions in which
representation is or is not congruent with the programmes that parties present
to their electorates. There should be a high level of congruence where a
continuing feedback between the policy decisions of parties in a national
parliament and their voters co-ordinates the views of representatives and those
they represent (cf. Cox 1997; Easton 1965). However, these conditions are not
met in the European Parliament. Instead, there is no co-ordination in the
aggregation of programmes that parties present to their national electorates and
the policies endorsed by multinational party groups in the European
Parliament.
The EP’s rules require a party group to have at least 25 members from a
minimum of at least seven countries; the average group aggregates MEPs
from more than 15 countries. They are not electoral parties appearing on the
ballots of the 27 national constituencies electing MEPs. They are parliamen-
tary caucuses organised to conduct the EP’s business.1 The enactment of
major EP policies requires endorsement by an absolute majority of MEPs.
Since no group comes anywhere near having a majority, groups whose MEPs
competed with each other in their national constituency must aggregate their
votes if the Parliament is to have a positive inﬂuence over policies (see
Kreppel 2002). Lord and Pollak (2010: 118) charge that this multi-stage
process of aggregation ‘undermines standards by which political power is
justiﬁed to the represented’.
Our focus on the aggregation of national programmes within a
multinational EP majority adds a theoretical level to approaches that focus on
whether national party programmes represent the preferences of voters
(Volkens 2007) or on cohesion in EP voting in a multi-national party group
(Hix et al. 2007; Vote Watch 2012). It does so by linking the aggregation of
national party programmes in party groups with the votes of groups combining
to form an EP majority on policies. First, we set out propositions about how
multi-level institutions inﬂuence agreement between the national programmes
on which MEPs are elected and the aggregate position of their group. Ideology
is most important. Secondly, we set out competing theories of how different
groups form majority coalitions in EP voting, and ﬁnd that cartel theory
provides a better explanation than spatial models of ideological proximity (cf.
Katz and Mair 2009). The lack of co-ordination of group policies and that of
their nationally elected MEPs threatens the claims of EP majorities to represent
what European voters endorse. Our data comes from the EU Proﬁler analysis
of the programmes of national parties contesting the 2009 European Parliament
election. Its unique feature is that party positions have been determined
through Internet-based interaction between researchers at the European
University Institute, Florence, and more than 250 national parties (see Trechsel
and Mair 2009).
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National Parties Represent; EP Party Groups Aggregate
Studies of representation in the European Parliament focus on two different
levels of the multi-level system of EU government. Many follow the Miller
and Stokes (1963) model of testing the congruence between the position of
voters and their members of Congress (see e.g. Rosema et al. 2011). The
empirical and normative question is: to what extent do the policy positions of
representatives elected to the European Parliament match those of their
electors. Others (Hix et al. 2007; Vote Watch 2012) have analysed recorded
roll call votes to establish the extent to which MEPs from different countries
vote together in a group. Neither approach shows whether national party
programmes on which MEPs are elected are congruent with the votes that
MEPs cast in the European Parliament.
Multinational Aggregation of National Parties
In a European Parliament election, parties compete nationally to represent a
single country’s citizens. Each member state is a separate constituency with its
own nationally determined party system. When the list system of proportional
representation is used, the national party committee determining positions on
the list has a disciplinary hold on MEPs that their party group lacks. Each
national party determines the content of the programme on which its
candidates seek election. In making up their national programmes, parties give
priority to what suits their national context without regard to the statements of
the multinational federations to which their MEPs afﬁliate (Sigalas and Pollak
2012).
There is virtually no co-ordination between the campaigns in the 27
national constituencies and EP party groups. The rules of the European
Parliament forbid EP party groups spending funds to participate in national
election campaigns. Campaigns are conducted in more than two dozen
different languages and media networks (Bardi et al. 2010). The attitudes noted
by Lodge and Herman (1982: 19) after the ﬁrst EP election persist; national
parties view supranational party groups as irrelevant, potentially disruptive or
even as an anathema. In the 2009 EP election, the outcome of 27 uncoordi-
nated national ballots was the return of 736 MEPs from 161 different parties.
The median EU member state is represented by ﬁve parties and ﬁve states
return at least eight different parties.
The parties for which Europeans vote in their national constituencies are
not the party groups that determine the policies of the European Parliament.
Since the foundation of the European Assembly in 1952, the precursor of the
European Parliament, members have sat in transnational party groups.
Transnational groups act as a counterweight to national governments
represented in the European Council. Whatever the national signiﬁcance of a
party, its MEPs are too small in number to dominate their party group. The
median national party returns two MEPs and 50 parties have only one MEP.
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Party groups aggregate the activities of MEPs from diverse countries into
disciplined parliamentary fractions (Lindberg et al. 2008: 112ff). There are
strong organisational incentives for MEPs to join a group, since their national
party is far too small to inﬂuence the EP on its own, nor is it recognised by
the Parliament. Groups allocate resources such as ofﬁce space and
administrative assistance and key positions in the EP’s committee structure.
MEPs depend on their transnational party group for guidance about what
position to take on the many issues that come up about which they have little
knowledge and no readily discernible political stake (Ringe 2010). Although
‘MEPs have stronger attitudinal links to their national party than to their EP
party group’, they are much more likely to follow instructions about how to
vote from their party group (Rasmussen 2008: 1168, 1172). Providing cues to
inexperienced MEPs is particularly relevant because of the high turnover of
MEPs from one parliament to the next. Just over half of the MEPs elected in
2009 were new members, a pattern that has persisted for many elections
(European Parliament 2009: 36).
Groups are caucus parties giving intense albeit introverted attention to
activities within the EP and its relations with other EU institutions. Each group
has a formal, hierarchical structure with leaders that negotiate with other
groups (see Bailer et al. 2009; Bressanelli 2012). A group’s leaders are
responsible for arriving at agreements with other groups. In interpreting the
scope for give-and-take in negotiations between groups, the volume and
complexity of issues gives the representative of a group with a large
membership signiﬁcant discretion vis-à-vis the bulk of its MEPs. Whereas in
national parliaments all those participating in such negotiations are accountable
to the same national electorate, the leaders of each EP party group are only
accountable for support to their multinational caucus.
The functions of party groups differ from those of national parties of
member states (Kreppel 2002; Ladrech 2009). Groups do not nominate
candidates or contest elections. Moreover, MEPs cannot engage in a perpetual
campaign for votes because they are out of their country for most of the week
and their activities in Brussels receive little media coverage nationally.
Inasmuch as the outcome in each national constituency is determined by ﬁrst-
order national politics and what happens at the EU level is of secondary
importance (see Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt 2009), there is limited
incentive for MEPs to spend time campaigning. Unlike a national parliamen-
tary system, the votes of party groups are not determined by the need to
support or oppose a government. If only by default, deliberating on policies
becomes the primary function of the European Parliament and the co-decision
process of the Lisbon Treaty substantially enhances its inﬂuence on policy.
Since a party group can be organised with only 25 of the European
Parliament’s membership,2 there could be up to 30 groups. However, following
the 2009 EP election, MEPs aggregated themselves into eight groups,
including one that is a residual collection of non-aligned MEPs. Groups differ
substantially in their size, the number of countries represented, and the number
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of parties represented (Table 1). The largest group, the European People’s
Party, has 36 per cent of the seats; the Socialists are second with one-quarter
of the seats; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has one-
tenth of the seats and other groups are relatively small. Although all groups
are European in name, only two – the European Socialists and the European
People’s Party – include parties from all or almost all member states. Since EP
rules allow a group to have more than one party from a single state, there are
substantial differences in the extent to which a group aggregates parties that
compete against each other nationally. The EPP has 41 parties, whereas the
Socialists apply the norm of one party per country. The absence of national
electoral sanctions against changing groups at the EP level makes it easy for
MEPs to migrate between groups and over time there have been signiﬁcant
changes in the labels and membership of most groups (see e.g. Corbett et al.
2011: chapter 5).
The Effects of Aggregation: Theories, Propositions and Data
The priority of a party group is to ensure that its multinational members vote
together in order for the group to exercise inﬂuence on EU policymaking.
However, the absence of co-ordination between the positions that MEPs take
nationally and decisions taken by each group at the EU level creates the
potential for conﬂict between the national commitments of MEPs and the
majority position emerging from the aggregation of national programmes in
multinational groups.
Theories about How Aggregation Affects Representation
The logic of spatial analysis (Enelow and Hinich 1984; McElroy and Benoit
2010) is that each national party should join a group whose members are closest
to its own programme. A multinational party group can be representative if the
programmes that their national parties put to their respective electorates are
collectively in agreement. Because ideologies have transnational relevance,
TABLE 1
COMPOSITION OF EP PARTY GROUPS
Party groups
Countries Parties MEPs Seats Votes
N N N % %
European People’s 26 41 265 36.0 32.0
Socialists 27 28 184 25.0 22.3
ALDE: Liberals 19 29 84 11.4 9.8
Greens 14 19 55 7.5 7.5
Left-Nordic Green 13 15 35 4.8 3.8
Conservative & Reform 8 9 54 7.3 4.8
Freedom & Democracy 9 9 32 4.3 4.5
Non-aligned 9 11 27 3.7 3.6
Total 27 161 736 100 88.4
Source: European Parliament (2009: 14).
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whether socialist, religious, environmentalist or European federalist, ideological
theories imply that agreement on major values can lead national parties to join
party groups that represent a common transnational ideology, because its mem-
bers will have been elected on similar national programmes that minimise the
effect of aggregation on policy representation (Ringe 2010: 212). Because an
ideology reﬂects a comprehensive Weltanschauung, it can maintain a high
degree of agreement across multiple dimensions of public policy (Table 2: Prop-
osition 1). In effect, ideology can produce congruence without co-ordination.
Historically, Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism have been ideologies
salient to party formation in many lands that are now EU member states
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and many contemporary studies differentiate party
groups on ideological grounds (see e.g. Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Among
the EP’s party groups, Socialists have had more than a century of viewing
policies through an ideological lens and have maintained transnational links
through meetings of the Socialist International. Catholic parties were signiﬁcant
in the founder states of the European Union. However, ideological unity has
been diluted by the accession of Northern European parties where Catholicism
has never been a political force and by the withdrawal of the Catholic Church
from sponsoring national parties. This implies that the European People’s
Party, the heir to the Catholic tradition, will be less ideologically cohesive.
Liberalism was a major political movement in pre-1914 Europe with a
comprehensive ideology challenging pre- or anti-democratic conservative
groups. However, since the Second World War there have been disagreements
between or within countries about the policies common to a liberal ideology
(MacCallum Scott 1967).
The small number of members required to form a group enables it to make
ideological demands on MEPs that restrict its membership without preventing
it from claiming the beneﬁts of a group. Since only seven national parties are
required to form an EP group, a small group can be formed by requiring strict
agreement on policy before admitting members (Proposition 2). Two groups,
the Conservative and Reform and Freedom and Democracy, have only nine
parties each.
TABLE 2
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT AGGREGATION AND PARTY GROUP REPRESENTATION
(predicted group placement)
P1. Groups with comprehensive ideologies will be representative of their national parties across
multiple dimensions of public policy. (Socialists, EPP, Liberals)
P2. The fewer the number of national parties in a group, the greater the group’s
representativeness of its member parties. (Conservative & Reform, Freedom & Democracy)
P3. Groups with a deﬁning principle will not be representative of their national parties on non-
core issues. (Greens, Left-Greens)
P4. Groups formed on a ‘catchall’ basis for instrumental beneﬁts will be low in
representativeness across all dimensions. (Non-aligned)
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Since the European Parliament unites parties representing 27 diverse
national electorates, this can make it harder to form groups united across a
range of policy dimensions. In such circumstances, a group can be formed by
giving priority to a single deﬁning principle and being indifferent to agreement
on other dimensions. Such selectivity will result in a group having a high
degree of representativeness on its deﬁning dimension but not on dimensions
of little signiﬁcance to its members (Proposition 3). The environmental
movement nominally appears to be deﬁned by a single principle but theories
of ‘new politics’ treat it as a movement with a distinctive and comprehensive
ideology (cf. Kitschelt 1989; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). There are now
more than two dozen Green parties in the European Parliament (cf. Kitschelt
1989). The presence of two green groups in the EP, one of which explicitly
links itself with the Left while the other does not, calls attention to the choice
of uniting around a single principle or having a comprehensive ideology.
Similarly, nationalist and anti-EU parties may represent a single principle of
national identity or a comprehensive ideology. The same alternatives apply to
so-called populist parties; they may simply protest against the status quo or
alternatively endorse radical policy change (see Mudde 2010).
The EP’s Rules of Procedure do not require a party group to have a
common ideology. Rule 30 simply states: ‘Members may form themselves into
Groups according to their political afﬁnities’ (Bardi et al. 2010: 11f; emphasis
added). Almond (1960: 43) has hypothesised that the ‘aggregative potential of
pragmatic parties is relatively high’. The institutional advantages of group
membership such as favourable assignments of committees, ofﬁces and other
beneﬁts make it possible for national parties without an ideological afﬁnity to
band together in a catchall group (cf. Kirchheimer 1966). The pragmatic
pursuit of institutional beneﬁts can be a sufﬁcient motive for MEPs to join a
party group, without regard to the extent to which its position matches that of
their national programme. Insofar as this is the case, then aggregation will tend
to displace representation (Proposition 4). The non-aligned group should be the
paradigm example of a group constituted to secure institutional resources for
instrumental rather than ideological reasons. The large size of the European
People’s Party could be a sign that it has compensated for a decline in
ideological agreement by becoming a catchall party.
Identifying Policy Dimensions
If party programmes differ on only a single dimension, then no question of
priorities between dimensions can arise, since all issues in programmes will be
reduced to a single common denominator. Downs’ (1957) model of party
competition on a single dimension, usually characterised as left vs. right, has
been used by generations of survey researchers to position parties (see e.g.
Klingemann et al. 2007; for critiques, see Albright 2010: 700ff; Mair 2007).
Many EP studies add a second dimension, the attitude of national parties
towards European integration (e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Marks and
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Steenbergen (2004), building on research into ‘new politics’ at the national
level (cf. Inglehart 1990), have proposed a GAL/TAN dimension differentiating
EP parties, with one end representing Green, Alternative and Libertarian
(GAL) positions as against Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN)
views (cf. Thomassen 2009: 86).
The data used to place national parties on policy dimensions vary (for a
review, see Marks 2007). Surveys of voters ask respondents to assess the issue
positions of parties as well as their own position; the 2009 European Election
Study collects complementary data about parties, candidates and the media
(http://www.piredeu.eu). Expert surveys ask political scientists to classify
parties on one or more pre-set dimensions of policy (see e.g. Benoit and Laver
2006; Hooghe et al. 2010; McElroy and Benoit 2010). The Comparative
Manifesto Group’s (Klingemann et al. 2007) methodology has been applied to
the analysis of manifestos issued by national parties for EP elections (Bardi
et al. 2010: 16ff; Braun et al. 2010). Comparisons of individual candidates and
party programmes ﬁnd that party programmes tend to determine the views of
their candidates, thus justifying making the programme the unit of analysis
(Schmitt et al. 2010). After reviewing different methods for ascertaining policy
dimensions, Dinas and Gemenis (2010) conclude that differences in data
sources are justiﬁable because of differing theoretical and analytic purposes.
The EU Proﬁler project of the European University Institute provides a
valid and reliable assessment of national party positions for the 2009 EP
election (Trechsel and Mair 2009: 11ff). Web 2.0 technology was used to
request from the headquarters of 274 national parties their position on a
ﬁve-point scale for 28 issues. Each party was asked to provide public domain
documentation, such as manifestos, statements by leaders or conference
resolutions, to conﬁrm the validity of its positions. Concurrently, social
scientists in the Proﬁler team knowing the relevant national language assigned
positions to all of a country’s parties on each issue. The reliability of codings
was high; on four-ﬁfths of issues there was agreement between a party’s self-
placement and that of the Proﬁler coders. Where there were differences, they
were usually matters of degree – for example, between completely agreeing
and tending to agree with a policy. To resolve differences, the team engaged in
further dialogue with national party ofﬁcials before making a ﬁnal judgement.
The EU Proﬁler database covers 156 of the 161 parties that won EP seats.3
Because we are concerned with how MEPs relate their group position to their
national party commitments, it is appropriate to use the Proﬁler database, since
its codes are formulated in dialogue with national party headquarters.
Aggregation leaves open to empirical investigation the number of policy
dimensions on which national parties take positions and how these dimensions
are determined. In the absence of agreement about the number and types of
cleavage that differentiate national parties (cf. Kriesi 2010; Lipset and Rokkan
1967), we factor analyse the Proﬁler data for 156 national parties. This
identiﬁes ﬁve different dimensions that collectively account for 60.8 per cent
of the variance in party positions (Table 3). The distinctiveness of each
Aggregation and Representation in European Parliament Party Groups 481
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dimension is shown by the fact that no single factor accounts for as much as
one-ﬁfth of the variance. The coherence of each factor is shown by the fact
that three-quarters of the measures loaded at 0.66 or higher.4 Five issues with
weak loadings that did not ﬁt any dimension have been excluded from
subsequent analysis (for details, see Appendix A and Borz and Rose 2010).
The dimensions are:
• EU integration (18.9 per cent of variance). The impact of EP policies
depends on the extent of European integration and integration is often
identiﬁed as important in two-dimensional analyses of popular attitudes
toward EU (see e.g. Dinas and Gemenis 2010). The factor includes
measures favouring an increase in EU powers and a reduction in the scope
for national vetoes.
• Permissiveness (12.0 per cent). This dimension differentiates six ‘post-
modern’ positions such as legalising soft drugs and same-sex marriage and
traditional views about religion and being tough on criminals. Some can be
found in the GAL-TAN dimension (Marks and Steenbergen 2004).
Although these issues are often dealt with at the national level, they can
involve ﬁrst-order differences between parties that ‘spill up’ to the
European level.
• Socio-economic welfare (11.1 per cent). In this dimension are issues central
to the conventional left/right dimension, such as maintaining social
programmes even if it means higher taxes, giving priority to lowering taxes
by cutting spending, and reducing regulations about workers’ rights to
encourage employment. The fact that it is not ﬁrst in statistical strength
raises a question about theories that make socio-economic differences
pre-eminent for EP parties.
• Green (9.5 per cent). Environmentalist statements about renewable energy,
pollution taxes and global warming form a dimension that is both clear
and also narrow in scope.
• Anti-immigration (9.3 per cent). The leading issues are whether immigrants
should accept the culture of their host country and if there should be
TABLE 3
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF EU PROFILER ISSUES
Factors
Rotated loadings
Eigen value Variance (%) cumulative variance (%)
EU integration 5.28 18.86 18.86
Permissive 3.37 12.03 30.89
Pro welfare 3.10 11.08 41.96
Green 2.66 9.51 51.48
Anti-immigration 2.60 9.27 60.75
Source: Borz and Rose (2010: 9). For full details, see Appendix Tables. Extraction Method:
Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation; rotation
converged in seven iterations.
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restrictions on further immigration. Whether Turkey should be admitted to
the EU is also included, since its application has raised the issue of the
cultural scope of the EU.
Consistent with theories of party competition, when national party positions
are weighted by their number of MEPs, the transnational parliament is divided
on four of the ﬁve dimensions. On socio-economic welfare and immigration,
the division is so close that the median MEP is neutral. There is a narrow
majority against permissive policies and a majority of MEPs in favour of green
policies. On one dimension there is a consensus: European integration. Five-
sixths of MEPs favour more policies promoting ever-closer union. Because the
2009 European Parliament was the ﬁrst to include all 12 new member states,
we checked whether the distributions in Figure 1 were due to structural
differences between MEPs from old EU member states and formerly
FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF MEPS ON POLICY DIMENSIONS ABOUT HERE
Source: Compiled from data in EU Proﬁler, as reported in Borz and Rose (2010; 41ff).
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Communist countries. The two categories are similar, with the exception that
parties in new EU member states are a little more opposed to permissive poli-
cies and those in old member states slightly more in favour of anti-immigrant
policies.5
Testing Propositions Regarding Group Representation
If multinational party groups represent the views of their nationally elected
member parties, then an index of party group representation will show a high
degree of congruence between the dominant position of the group and that of
the national programmes of its member parties. This is different from the Index
of Cohesion of Hix, Noury and Roland (2007: chapter 5), which measures
whether a group’s members are voting as a bloc but does not refer to the
positions that they take on issues in their national party programmes.
The starting point for calculating the Index is the position of each national
party on each of the multiple indicators that are included in each of the ﬁve
dimensions (Appendix A). The EU Proﬁler classiﬁes party positions on a ﬁve-
point scale: completely agrees, tends to agree, neutral or no opinion, tends to
disagree or completely disagrees; these are coded from +2 to –2 respectively.
A national party’s position on a dimension is determined by summing the
scores on all its indicators, and dividing by the number of indicators. Its MEPs
are then classiﬁed as being positive on the indicator if the mean score is higher
than 0.0 and up to 2.0; neutral if 0.0; and negative if lower than 0.0 (for
details, see Borz and Rose 2010). The proportion of a group’s MEPs whose
programmes fall in each of the three categories are then summed and given
percentages.
The Index of Party Group Representation is created by subtracting the per-
centage of a group’s MEPs in the minority on a dimension from the percentage
in the group’s majority position.6 The Index thus ranges from 100, if the
national programmes of all parties aggregated in a group endorse the same
position on a dimension to 0, total disagreement, if 50 per cent take one posi-
tion and 50 per cent take the opposite. As the value of the Index falls, the
more divided a group is on a dimension. If the group’s whips nonetheless pro-
duce unity in an EP vote, this will force a substantial minority to misrepresent
the programme on which they were elected when they cast their EP vote.
There is substantial variation between groups in the Index scores on a given
dimension. The range is from 3 to 100 (Table 4). A group’s mean Index is cal-
culated by averaging its position across all ﬁve policy dimensions. There is
substantial variation in the extent to which aggregation affects representation;
mean group scores range from 88 to 25.
The ﬁrst proposition is given partial support, because groups historically
linked with comprehensive ideologies vary in the extent to which they are
representative across all policy dimensions (Table 4). The Socialist group’s
ideology does ﬁt the ﬁrst proposition. Even though some members of the
Socialist International have promoted ‘third way’ programmes, while others are
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offshoots of former East European Communist parties, it is highly representa-
tive of its member parties across four dimensions. The Index of Party Group
Representation is 100 on European integration, 90 on socio-economic welfare,
83 on green issues and 73 in rejecting anti-immigrant policies. Cross-national
differences about the permissive society lower that Index score to 51.
By contrast, the historic ideologies of two other EP groups are no longer
comprehensive (Table 4). The EPP’s aggregation of national parties from secu-
lar as well as Catholic societies, along with changes within Catholic societies,
have reduced the signiﬁcance of that comprehensive philosophy. On three
dimensions – socio-economic welfare, immigration and green issues – the
EPP’s Index shows limited or no congruence. Yet the EPP has not become a
catchall party lacking representative characteristics. Its opposition to permissive
measures is shown by an Index score of 95 and it displays even higher
agreement on European integration (Table 4). The EPP thus falls between the
categories of a party with a comprehensive ideology and a party appealing
with a single deﬁning principle.
The ALDE is an aggregation of national parties from the European Liberal
Democrat and Reform group and from the European Democratic group.
Consistent with being a ‘catchall’ group, it accepts two national parties as
members from more than half the countries it covers. It is very divided on four
of the ﬁve policy dimensions, including such classic liberal principles as immi-
gration and permissiveness (Table 4). However, its 29 parties show 100 per
cent agreement in support of European integration; this makes ALDE a para-
digm example of proposition 3, a group representing its members on a single
deﬁning policy dimension.
Contrary to proposition 2, the number of parties in a group does not affect its
representativeness; the correlation between the number of parties and their Index
of Party Group Representation, –0.01, is not signiﬁcant. Among groups with few
parties, the Index varies greatly. The Freedom and Democrats and the Conserva-
tive and Reform group each has only nine parties, but there is much more cohe-
sion in the former (Index of Party Group Representation: 68) than in the latter
TABLE 4
INDEX OF PARTY GROUP REPRESENTATION BY POLICY DIMENSION
EU Welfare Permissive Green Anti-immig Mean
Green 78 94 90 90 a90 88
Left-Green a37 97 100 94 a82 82
Socialist 100 90 51 83 a73 79
Free & Dem a78 a45 a59 a68 88 68
Non-aligned a65 43 a83 a40 100 66
EPP 98 a55 a95 3 52 61
ALDE 100 a14 23 17 a9 33
Cons & Ref a28 a32 a6 a4 57 25
Notes: Index range 100 to 0. If the largest bloc of MEPs is against, the index is marked with an a.
Source: EU Proﬁler data as reported in Borz and Rose (2010: 26–37). Index calculated by subtract-
ing from a group’s largest percentage of MEPs the percentage of its opposing bloc.
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(Index: 25). Among the groups that have the most national parties as members
(see Table 1), the mean Index ranges from 80 for the Socialists to 33 for ALDE.
Green parties label themselves by a single deﬁning principle. Since the
environment is a collective good affecting all Europeans, then, consistent with
proposition 3, they could represent this principle without taking positions on
other dimensions. However, both Green groups have a comprehensive
ideology, consistent with Marks and Steenbergen’s (2004) argument that Green
politics is a new ideology (Table 3). Across policy dimensions, both groups
are consistently more united in representing their national parties than is the
Socialist group. The Index of Representation for the Green group is consis-
tently high (mean score: 88). The European United Left/Nordic Green Left
group, a refuge for former Communists after the fall of the Berlin Wall, is very
representative of its national parties on four policy dimensions. The one issue
on which it is divided is European integration.
Because the purpose of the non-aligned group is to gain its national
members the institutional beneﬁts that the EP gives to groups, Proposition 4
postulates that the non-aligned group should be catchall. However, this is not
the case. Its member parties are 100 per cent in agreement in being anti-immi-
grant and have a high Index score in opposition to the permissive society. The
racist and often homophobic positions of its members, such as the British
National Party and the French National Front, suggest that the non-aligned
group is not so much a residual catchall category as it is a meeting place for
‘pariah’ parties that are unwelcome on policy grounds by other EP groups.
The Conservative and Reform group is the one catchall aggregation of national
parties. It was created by the British Conservative Party after its withdrawal
from the EPP because of opposition to European integration. It succeeded in
securing partners in enough other countries to gain the institutional advantages
of group membership without regard to afﬁnities of policy. The mean Index of
the Conservative and Reform group, 25, is the lowest of any EP group. More-
over, its two leading members, the British Conservatives and the Polish Law
and Justice Party, are on opposite sides on four of ﬁve policy dimensions
(Borz and Rose 2010: 34).
Differences between party groups deny uniform support for Cox’s theory
that the lack of co-ordination will cause each group to fall far short of
representing the programmes of national parties and theories that transnational
ideologies will make each group representative of its member parties’
programmes. Three of the propositions set out in Table 2 ﬁt at least one party
group, albeit not necessarily as expected. Ideology, stressed in proposition 1,
does make three EP groups – the Socialists, the Left-Greens and the Greens –
represent the programmes of their national parties. Although ALDE does not
have a comprehensive ideology, it is representative, in terms of proposition 3,
having a single deﬁning principle. The Conservative and Reform group is a
catchall group, as described in proposition 4. The proposition that size matters
is the only one that does not receive some support; groups with fewer mem-
bers are no more likely to be representative than are large groups. Three EP
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groups, including the largest one, the EPP, are contingently representative: the
extent to which the group view is shared by its national party members
depends on the dimension.
In place of co-ordination by European-level party groups or transnational
co-ordination by ideological party families (Mair and Mudde 1998), MEPs
appear to use a ‘pick and mix’ strategy to join a group in which a majority of
members take positions consistent with dimensions important to their national
party. While this challenges political science theories that reduce groups to a
single dimension or uniform typology, it increases the collective
representativeness of the European Parliament on each of the ﬁve policy
dimensions. When the focus on representation is shifted from the level of
multinational groups to national parties, then on each dimension there is a high
degree of congruence between the positions on which MEPs are elected and
the majority view of their party group. Whichever side their group takes, 94
per cent of MEPs are in a party group with a majority endorsing the same
position as their national party programme on European integration; 85 per
cent of MEPs have national programmes matching the majority position of
their group on socio-economic welfare and permissive policies, as do 82 per
cent on immigration and 80 per cent on green issues.7 In a sense, these ﬁgures
are methodologically determined. In the absence of EP groups preparing a
central programme on which its national members ﬁght an election, then the
degree to which MEPs are in a group that represents an electorate is deﬁned
by the sum of its members’ national programmes. However, a measure of
policies for which a group can claim a mandate from its electorate is not proof
of how this mandate relates to the policy outputs of the European Parliament.
Aggregating Majorities Supplants Representation
If parties are to be effective in representing their voters, they must have their
policies enacted into law; otherwise, they provide only representation without
legislation (see Cox 1997: 226). Approval of major measures by the European
Parliament requires endorsement by an absolute majority. No group comes
close to having an absolute EP majority. Therefore, several groups must
aggregate their votes if the Parliament is to approve new EU policies; failure
to do so means that, notwithstanding the formal powers granted it by EU
treaties, the European Parliament becomes a ‘do nothing’ parliament. An
absolute majority requires negotiations between group leaders. Any agreement
between group leaders will require MEPs who have competed with each other
in their national constituencies to vote together.
Three Theories of Majority Formation
Theories of spatial modelling postulate that parties close to each other on a
policy will vote together. Insofar as this is the case, the majority formed will
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tend to be representative of European citizens consistent with Huber and
Powell’s 1994 (Figure 1) theory of coalition representation. The three groups
on the left – the Socialists and the two Green groups – have positions on all
policy dimensions that match those of the great majority of the 62 national
parties that belong to them. However, the ﬁve non-left groups, with 99 national
parties, do not represent common policies across dimensions (Table 3). They
are a category deﬁned by what they are not rather than a coalition agreeing on
policy. Since EP decisions are not votes of conﬁdence in government, there is
no need for non-left groups to form the same coalition on all ﬁve dimensions
of policy. Instead, policies can be endorsed by what the Danes call a ‘jumping
majority’, that is, ad hoc combinations as MEPs allied on one dimension take
different positions on another.
Proposition 5. The greater the degree of shared positions on a given pol-
icy dimension, the more likely party groups are to combine in a majority
on a policy.
Minimum winning coalition theory postulates that the number of MEPs a
party has is more important than ideological proximity. The fewer the number
of parties aggregated in a coalition, the more beneﬁts, or ‘spoils’, each may
claim (cf. Riker 1962). The relative remoteness of the Parliament from Euro-
pean citizens gives party groups much leeway in deciding coalition partners
independent of national programme commitments. Since the number of MEPs
is consistent across dimensions, a minimum winning coalition can also be sta-
ble, an asset in bargaining with the Council, which has co-decision powers
with the EP.
Proposition 6. Independent of national party programmes, the minimum
number of groups needed for a majority will combine together across
policy dimensions.
A deﬁning principle uniting MEPs across group lines is endorsement of
measures to promote ever closer European Union through the classic Monnet
strategy of the gradual accumulation of authority in multiple policy dimen-
sions (Haas 1958). When MEPs are asked whether there should be more or
less EU-wide regulation in seven different social and economic areas, an
average of 64 per cent favour more EU regulation, ﬁve times the percentage
wanting less (calculated from Farrell et al. 2011). MEPs are similarly activist
about extending EU activities in home affairs and foreign policy: 65 per cent
favour more EU action, four times the proportion wanting the EU to do less.
Agreement on a deﬁning principle creates the institutional ‘common good’ of
maximising the inﬂuence of the European Parliament vis-à-vis other EU insti-
tution and, more generally, enhancing the power of the EU (Kreppel 2002:
214). The common good of the EP may thus be given precedence. This is
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consistent with the Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) cartel theory, which predicts
that, in order to secure collective beneﬁts, groups will form more than a mini-
mum winning coalition.
Proposition 7. Party groups will advance the common good of the EP by
combining in majorities independent of national party programmes.
The Political Arithmetic of Policy Enactment
When there are only three positions – for, against or neutral – then most of the
eight party groups will necessarily have positions that substantially agree
with at least one other group, thus making it easier to combine to form a
parliamentary majority. On three Proﬁler policy dimensions – economic
welfare, permissiveness and European integration – four party groups are posi-
tive and four groups are negative. On environmental issues and immigration,
four party groups are on one side, three on the other, and one group is neutral.
However, whether a combination of three or four groups constitutes an
absolute majority depends on the number of MEPs that it has.
Consistent with proposition 5, the three left-wing party groups – the Social-
ists, the Greens and the Left Greens – have a high degree of ideological prox-
imity. Not only is each internally cohesive but they also normally take the
same programmatic position (Table 4). For these groups to aggregate their
votes into an ideological coalition creates no conﬂict with national party pro-
grammes. However, such a combination cannot enact legislation because it
lacks a majority. The Socialist group has only 184 of the 369 votes required
for an EP majority and the Greens and Left-Greens together have only 90
seats. Thus, a combination of the three ideologically similar groups would still
be almost 100 MEPs short of a majority. Even though the European People’s
Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and the Conservative
and Reform group together have a notional majority of MEPs, they cannot
form a coalition based on ideological proximity because there is no dimension
on which all three parties show agreement. Moreover, internal disagreements
on policies in the EP’s third-largest group, ALDE, make it an unpredictable
partner. Thus, the ideological proximity proposition is rejected.
Agreement between the European People’s Party and the Socialists meets
the minimum winning condition of proposition 6, since the two parties together
have three-ﬁfths of the EP’s seats. However, political ideology appears as an
obstacle to a ‘black–red’ coalition; instead of being spatially close, they take
opposing positions on most dimensions.8 Whereas 90 per cent of Socialist
MEPs have programme commitments endorsing state action to promote
economic welfare, 70 per cent of EPP members are against doing so. When per-
missive issues arise, 74 per cent of Socialist MEPs endorse them, whereas 96
per cent of EPP members take socially conservative positions. There is a similar
gap between the two groups on immigration. A total of 76 per cent of EPP
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members favour anti-immigration measures, while 85 per cent of Socialists
oppose them. On green issues, 86 per cent of Socialist MEPs endorse environ-
mentalist policies whereas only 35 per cent of EPP members do so. European
integration is the only dimension on which both groups agree (Table 4).
Aggregation Supplants Representation
A big majority of EP votes on major legislation are voice votes taken after
informal consultations between group leaders. The absence of a recorded vote
makes it easier to blur conﬂict between national programme commitments and
the position endorsed by an aggregation of groups. Although the minority of
EP votes taken by roll call vote are subject to selection effects (Hug 2010:
235), by default they are often used as statistical proxies for cooperation
between EP groups (see Hix et al. 2007; Vote Watch 2012).
Roll call voting supports proposition 7: MEPs are prepared to vote without
regard to party programmes in order to enact legislation that promotes the
common good of increasing EP inﬂuence on the course of European
integration. Notwithstanding the consistent opposition between the policy
positions of the EPP and Socialist groups, when votes are taken to enact
policies there is normally black–red agreement. In 69 per cent of cases in the
2009 Parliament to January 2012, a majority of EPP and Socialist MEPs voted
together9 and this pattern has persisted for decades (see Hix and Noury 2009;
Hix et al. 2007: 151). Black/red agreement is not a minimum winning
coalition, as postulated in proposition 6, because the common good of parlia-
ment encourages super-majorities. On 52 per cent of all roll call votes, MEPs
in the three biggest parties – the EPP, Socialists and ALDE – vote for the same
measure. As some smaller parties invariably favour the position the biggest
groups endorse, this further enlarges the majority approving legislation. The
super-majority pattern has persisted from one parliament to the next (Hix and
Hoyland, 2011: 145; Kreppel 2002: chapters 6–7; Vote Watch 2012).
The collective beneﬁt that the EP gains by aggregating majorities without
regard to national party programmes has a price. It greatly reduces the
representative status of MEPs because inter-group agreement requires many
elected representatives to vote against their national programmes. Pragmatic
‘black–red’ agreement on welfare and immigration measures creates almost as
much misrepresentation as representation. There is a difference of only two
MEPs between those whose national programmes endorse the combined major-
ity and minority positions on welfare and a difference of only four MEPs in
majority and minority positions on immigration (Figure 2). On permissive
issues, one-third of MEPs in a black–red combination are elected on a
programme different from that of the majority view. The lower level of conﬂict
on green issues is accounted for by the fact a plurality of EPP members
represent parties that are neutral. This not only enlarges the majority vote but
also increases the number of MEPs who ﬁnd themselves going against their
national party programme by supporting their group whip.10
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The sharing of a deﬁning principle across party groups is a central
characteristic of cartelisation. European integration is the policy dimension
most relevant to testing for cartelisation in order to advance the common good
of the European Parliament as a major institution of an EU system with
increasing powers. The MEPs of the three largest groups – the EPP, Socialists
and ALDE – are almost unanimously in favour of European integration.
Together, 532 of the three groups’ MEPs endorse integration in their national
programmes and only three are against. While on the other four dimensions
the groups offer a signiﬁcant choice between alternatives, there is no choice on
European integration (cf. Figure 2).
Whether agreement on European integration by EP party groups is a cartel
that denies choice to the European electorate depends on the empirical distribu-
tion of public opinion. Insofar as the percentage in favour is similar to that of
MEPs, there is a multi-level consensus among party groups, national parties and
their electorates. However, insofar as this is not the case, inter-group agreement
is a cartel excluding the representation of a signiﬁcant bloc of Europe’s citizens.
Instead of offering a choice between being for and against European inte-
gration, a question that blurs the distinction between the current position and
dynamic implications, the European Election Study asks respondents to register
their opinion on an 11-point scale ranging from 0, uniﬁcation has gone too far,
to 10, uniﬁcation should go further. Individuals who do not want movement in
either direction from the status quo can place themselves at the mid-point of
the scale, 5. The replies show a three-way division of public opinion, with no
FIGURE 2
TENSION AMONG MEPS IN BLACK/RED AGGREGATION ABOUT HERE
Aggregation and Representation in European Parliament Party Groups 491
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
rat
hc
lyd
e] 
at 
11
:16
 17
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
majority for any alternative. A total of 40 per cent approves more integration,
30 per cent wants less integration, and the median group, also 30 per cent,
endorses the status quo. Although there is a plurality approving more integra-
tion, the relevant point here is that the 40 per cent who do so are less than half
the 84 per cent of MEPs elected on programmes favouring further integration.
The result is a cartel in which the common good of EP groups does not reﬂect
the preferences of their voters. Whatever their views, the majority of European
voters are not offered the opportunity of voting for parties that will represent
their views. The EP consensus ‘downloads’ conﬂicts in representation to
national parties and their electorates.11
The multi-level aggregation of parties elected on national programmes into
multinational EP groups places far more strain on representation than in a
national political system with transparent accountability between MPs and
electors. Yet there are examples in national politics of the two biggest parties
competing with each other forming a Grand Coalition after the election; these
have been continuous in Switzerland, the norm in Austria and intermittent in
Germany. When the governing and opposition parties combine, this reconﬁgures
the choice that voters have; it is between cartel parties and parties that protest
against policies that governors ﬁnd in their common good – and protest parties
have had striking successes in Austria and Switzerland (cf. Mudde 2010; Rose
84%
1%
15%
40%
30% 30%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
For Neutral Against
MEPs Citizens
Q. Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say 
it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? 
FIGURE 3
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: VIEWS OF MEPS AND CITIZENS COMPARED ABOUT HERE
MEPs: EU Proﬁler data base of national programme commitments, 2009. Citizens: European Election Survey,
2009 (www.piredeu.eu).
Source: Respondents placing themselves at points 6 to 10 are classiﬁed as for more integration; at 0 to 4, in
favour of less; and at point 5 or no opinion, as neutral.
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2000). This implies that even though the inter-group cartel is well established in
the European Parliament it is not invulnerable. Electors who do not feel
represented by the European Parliament can, as national citizens, vote for parties
that challenge the European-level consensus.
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Notes
1. In this article the term party refers to the national organisations that contest seats in one of the
EP’s national constituencies. The term ‘party group’ describes the eight organisations
recognised in the organisation of the activities of the European Parliament.
2. The Lisbon Treaty ﬁxes 751 as the maximum number of MEPs. Because the Treaty came into
effect in the middle of the current Parliament, the number of MEPs elected in 2009 was 736.
3. The ﬁve parties it did not classify elected only seven MEPs scattered among ﬁve different EP
party groups.
4. Having ﬁve dimensions, rather than the three identiﬁed in analyses of roll call votes (Hix et al.
2007) suggests that the issues raised in roll call voting may be narrower than those that parties
deal with in programmes that they prepare for EP elections.
5. Full details available from the authors.
6. Because there is a third alternative, a national party taking a neutral position, a plurality rather
than an absolute majority of MEPs can form the largest portion in a Group.
7. These ﬁgures cannot be interpreted as evidence of MEPs representing the European electorate,
because of gross disparities in the number of electors for each MEP between electorates in
more and less populous states due to the EP’s requirement of digressive proportionality (see
Rose et al. 2012).
8. The bimodal distribution of the groups’ MEPs is conﬁrmed by their distance from each other
on the +2.0 to –2.0 scale. On welfare, the EPP score is –1.00 and that of the Socialists 1.50.
On opposition to immigration, the respective scores are 1.00 and –0.67. On permissiveness
scores are –1.50 and 0.00; and on the Green dimension 0.00 and 0.67. European integration is
the only dimension where there is a unimodal distribution of the two groups: 1.43 for each.
9. Voting together by parties less opposed in spatial terms than EPP and Socialists is only 9 per
cent higher for the EPP and ALDE, and only 8 per cent higher for Socialist–ALDE voting.
10. Detailed results available from the authors.
11. Mattila and Raunio (2012) conﬁrm that respondents see the national parties that they vote for
as more pro-integration than themselves, but do not consider the implications of their ﬁnding
for the formation of a cartel promoting integration in the interest of EP party groups.
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APPENDIX TABLE A1
DETAILS OF DIMENSIONS OF PARTY GROUPS
Issues in each factor
Factor 1. EU INTEGRATION
21 On foreign policy issues such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should speak with one
voice
22 The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy
23 European integration is a good thing
24 This country is much better off in the EU than outside it
26 The European Parliament should be given more powers
27 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power
28 Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a national referendum
Factor 2. PERMISSIVE
7 The legalisation of same-sex marriages is a good thing
8 Religious values and principles should be shown greater respect in politics
9 The decriminalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed
10 Euthanasia should be legalised
19 Restrictions of civil liberties should be accepted in the ﬁght against terrorism
20 Criminals should be punished more severely
Factor 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC WELFARE
1 Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes
2 Greater efforts should be made to privatise healthcare services
11 Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes
14 Governments should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order to ﬁght unemployment
Factor 4. GREEN ENVIRONMENT
16 Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this
means higher energy costs
17 The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes such as road
taxation
18 Policies to ﬁght global warming should be encouraged even if they hamper economic growth
or employment
Factor 5. ANTI-IMMIGRATION
5 Immigration into this country should be made more restrictive
6 Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values
25 The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey
NOT IN ANY FACTOR
3 State subsidies for crèches and child care should be increased substantially
4 Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be encouraged as a means of
fostering economic growth
12 The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers
13 Governments should bail out failing banks with public money
15 The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe’s farmers
Source: EU Proﬁler data base: http://www.euproﬁler.eu
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